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Abstract—This paper studies physical layer security in a
wireless ad hoc network with numerous legitimate transmitter-
receiver pairs and eavesdroppers. A hybrid full-/half-duplex
receiver deployment strategy is proposed to secure legitimate
transmissions, by letting a fraction of legitimate receivers work
in the full-duplex (FD) mode sending jamming signals to confuse
eavesdroppers upon their information receptions, and letting the
other receivers work in the half-duplex mode just receiving their
desired signals. The objective of this paper is to choose properly
the fraction of FD receivers for achieving the optimal network
security performance. Both accurate expressions and tractable
approximations for the connection outage probability and the
secrecy outage probability of an arbitrary legitimate link are de-
rived, based on which the area secure link number, network-wide
secrecy throughput and network-wide secrecy energy efficiency
are optimized respectively. Various insights into the optimal
fraction are further developed and its closed-form expressions are
also derived under perfect self-interference cancellation or in a
dense network. It is concluded that the fraction of FD receivers
triggers a non-trivial trade-off between reliability and secrecy,
and the proposed strategy can significantly enhance the network
security performance.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, ad hoc network, full-
duplex receiver, outage, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rapid development in wireless communications hasbrought unprecedented attention to information security.
Traditionally, security issues are addressed at the upper layers
of communication protocols by using encryption. However,
the large-scale and dynamic topologies in emerging wireless
networks pose a great challenge in implementing secret key
management and distribution, particularly in a decentralized
wireless ad hoc network without infrastructure support [1].
Fortunately, physical layer security, an information-theoretic
approach that attains secure transmissions by exploiting the
randomness of wireless channels without necessarily relying
on secret keys, is becoming increasingly recognized as a
promising alternative to complement the cryptography-based
security mechanisms [2]-[17].
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Early studies on physical layer security have mainly focused
on point-to-point transmissions, and metrics from user view-
point such as secrecy capacity [3], ergodic secrecy rate [4],
[5] and secrecy outage probability [6]-[8] have been used to
evaluate the secrecy level in different scenarios/applications.
From a network-wide perspective, physical layer security has
also shown its potential [9], [10]. Many efforts have already
been devoted to improve network security in terms of the
area secure link number (ASLN) [11], [12] and network-wide
secrecy throughput (NST) [13], [14]. More recently, energy-
efficient green wireless network has attracted considerable
interests due to energy scarcity, and some research works have
been carried out for enhancing network-wide secrecy energy
efficiency (NSEE) [15], [16].
A. Previous Endeavors and Motivations
To improve the secrecy of information delivery for an ad hoc
network, an efficient approach is to degrade the wiretapping
ability of eavesdroppers through emitting jamming signals
[17]. For example, the authors in [13] propose a cooperative
jamming strategy with single-antenna legitimate transmitters,
and when eavesdroppers access a transmitter’s secrecy guard
zone [13], this transmitter will act as a friendly jammer to
send jamming signals to confuse eavesdroppers. This work
is extended by [14] to a multi-antenna transmitter scenario,
and artificial noise [17] with either sectoring or beamforming
is exploited to impair eavesdroppers. Although these endeav-
ors are shown to achieve a remarkable secrecy throughput
enhancement, friendly jammers or multi-antenna transmitters
might not be available in many applications. For instance,
constrained by the size and hardware cost, a sensor node is
usually equipped with only a single antenna. Furthermore, due
to a low-power constraint, a sensor has no extra power to send
jamming signals. In such unfavorable situations, information
transfer is still vulnerable to eavesdropping.
Fortunately, recent advances in developing in-band full-
duplex (FD) radios provide a new opportunity to strengthen
information security in the aforementioned situations. Effec-
tive self-interference cancellation (SIC) techniques enable a
transceiver to transmit and receive at the same time on the
same frequency band [18]. Although the transmitter (sensor)
is vulnerable to eavesdropping, we can deploy powerful FD
receivers such as data collection stations to radiate jamming
signals upon their information receptions. By doing so, ad-
ditional degrees of freedom can be gained for improving
2network security. In fact, the idea of using FD receiver
jamming to improve physical layer security has already been
reported by [19]-[24] for point-to-point transmission scenarios.
Specifically, the authors in [19] and [20] consider a single-
input multi-output (SIMO) channel with the receiver using
single- and multi-antenna jamming, respectively. The authors
in [21] consider a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) channel
with both transmitter and receiver generating artificial noise.
These works are further extended in two-way transmissions
[22], cooperative communications [23], [24], and cellular
networks [25]. Recently, we have studied the design of the
optimal density of the overlaid FD-mode tier to maximize its
NST while guaranteeing a minimum network-wide throughput
for the underlaid HD-mode tier [26]. Generally, investigating
the potential benefits of FD receiver jamming techniques in
enhancing information security from a network perspective is
an interesting, but much more sophisticated issue, since we
should take into account numerous interferers and eavesdrop-
pers that are randomly distributed over the network. In addi-
tion, using FD receiver jamming in a network is confronted
with two fundamental challenges as follows:
• Theoretically, activating too many FD receivers to
send jamming signals brings severe self- and mutual-
interference to legitimate receivers, thus impairing the
reliability of the ongoing information transmission. This
will result in few secure links being established and
accordingly the poor secrecy throughput.
• Practically, employing FD receivers incurs more system
cost and overhead. FD transceivers are more expen-
sive than half-duplex (HD) transceivers. From energy
efficiency perspective, more circuit power is consumed
to enable the FD operation or to mitigate the self-
interference caused by FD radios, which leads to low
energy efficiency.
Motivated by these, a proper way to deploy FD receivers is
to make a portion of legitimate receivers work in the FD mode
simultaneously sending jamming signals and receiving desired
signals, and make the rest work in the HD mode just receiving
desired signals. This results in a hybrid full-/half-duplex
receiver deployment strategy. Then, a question is naturally
raised: What should be the optimal fraction of FD receivers
in order to optimize the network security performance? To the
best of our knowledge, this question has not been answered
by existing literature. So far, a fundamental analysis on the
network security performance, in aspects like ASLN, NST and
NSEE, is still lacking for a wireless ad hoc network with
hybrid full-/half-duplex receivers. This motivates our work.
B. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we study physical layer security for a wireless
ad hoc network under a stochastic geometry framework [27].
Each transmitter in this network is equipped with a single an-
tenna and sends a secret message to an intended single-antenna
receiver, in the presence of randomly located multi-antenna
eavesdroppers. A hybrid full-/half-duplex receiver deployment
strategy is proposed, where a fraction of legitimate receivers
work in the FD mode receiving desired signals and radiating
jamming signals simultaneously, and the remaining receivers
work in the HD mode just receiving desired signals. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We investigate the fundamental tradeoff between secrecy
and reliability via jammers. We analyze the connection
outage probability and the secrecy outage probability
of a typical legitimate link, and provide both accurate
expressions and tractable approximations for them.
• We study three important performance metrics on net-
work security, namely, ASLN, NST and NSEE, respec-
tively. We prove that these metrics are all quasi-concave
functions of the fraction of FD receivers, and derive the
optimal deployment fractions to maximize them.
• We further develop insights into the behavior of the
optimal fraction of FD receivers with respect to various
network parameters. We also provide closed-form expres-
sions for this optimal fraction in special cases, e.g., under
a perfect SIC assumption or in a dense network.
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model. In Section III, we
analyze the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities
of an arbitrary legitimate link. In Sections IV, V and VI, we
optimize the fraction of FD receivers to maximize ASLN, NST
and NSEE, respectively. In Section VII, we conclude our work.
Notations: bold uppercase (lowercase) letters denote ma-
trices (vectors). (·)H , (·)−1, Pr{·}, and EA(·) denote Her-
mitian transpose, inversion, probability, and the expectation
of A, respectively. CN(µ, ν) denotes the circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance ν.
ln(·) denotes the natural logarithm. f ′(q) and f ′′(q) denote the
first- and second-order derivatives of f(q) on q, respectively.
1FD(x) is an indicator function with 1FD(x) = 1 for x ∈
{FD} and 1FD(x) = 0 for x /∈ {FD}. LI(s) = EI
(
e−sI
)
is
the Laplace transform of I . [x]+ , max(x, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless ad hoc network composed of
numerous single-antenna legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs,
coexisting with randomly located Ne-antenna eavesdroppers.
Each legitimate transmitter sends a secret message to its paired
receiver located a distance ro away
1. We assume that a fraction
q of legitimate receivers work in the FD mode such that each of
them simultaneously receives the desired signal and radiates
a jamming signal to confuse eavesdroppers, and the others
work in the HD mode only receiving desired signals. Legit-
imate receivers and eavesdroppers are distributed according
to independent homogeneous Poisson point processes (PPPs)
[28] Φl with density λl and Φe with density λe, respectively.
Using the property of thinning for a PPP, the distributions
of HD and FD receivers follow independent PPPs ΦHD with
density λHD = (1 − q)λl and ΦFD with density λFD = qλl,
1The assumption of a common legitimate link distance is quite generic in
analyzing a wireless ad hoc network [13], [14], which eases the mathematical
analysis. Nevertheless, in principle the obtained results can be generalized to
an arbitrary distribution of ro [27].
3respectively. We denote by Φ˜HD and Φ˜FD the location sets
of the transmitters corresponding to HD and FD receivers,
respectively. According to the displacement theorem [32, page
35], Φ˜HD and Φ˜FD are also independent PPPs with densities
λHD and λFD, respectively. We use rxy to denote the distance
between a node located at x and a node at y. For convenience,
we use x˜ to denote the location of a transmitter whose paired
receiver is located at x.
Wireless channels, including legitimate channels and wire-
tap channels, are assumed to suffer a large-scale path loss
governed by the exponent α > 2 together with a quasi-
static Rayleigh fading with fading coefficients independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) obeying CN(0, 1). Due to
uncoordinated concurrent transmissions, the aggregate inter-
ference at a receiver dominates the thermal noise. Thereby,
we concentrate on an interference-limited scenario by ignoring
thermal noise, given that the inclusion of thermal noise results
in a more complicated analysis but provides no significant
qualitative difference.
Throughout this paper, we denote S ∈ {HD, FD} by default.
For convenience, the legitimate link with an S receiver is
called an S-link. Considering a typical S receiver located at
the origin o, its signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) is given by
γSo =
Ptho˜or
−α
o
IHD + IFD + 1FD(S)ηPj
, (1)
where IHD ,
∑
x˜∈Φ˜HD Pthx˜or
−α
x˜o , I
FD ,∑
x˜∈Φ˜FD\o˜
(
Pthx˜or
−α
x˜o + Pjhxor
−α
xo
)
and ηPj denote the
interferences from HD links, from FD links and from the
typical FD receiver itself, respectively; Pt and Pj denote
the transmit powers of a legitimate transmitter and of an
FD receiver, respectively; hxy denotes the fading channel
gain obeying Exp(1); η is a parameter that reflects the
SIC capability, and η = 0 refers to a perfect SIC while
0 < η ≤ 1 corresponds to different levels of SIC. Note that
rx˜o and rxo in I
HD and IFD are correlated, and they satisfy
rx˜o =
√
r2xo + r
2
o − 2rxoro cos θx, where the angle θx is
uniformly distributed in the range [0, 2π].
For eavesdroppers, we consider a worst-case wiretap sce-
nario where each eavesdropper has multiuser decoding ability
and adopts a successive interference cancellation minimum
mean square error (MMSE) receiver. The eavesdropper located
at e is able to decode and cancel undesired information signals
and uses the MMSE detector
wSe =
(
RSe
)−1
go˜e (2)
to aggregate the desired signal, where RSe ,∑
x∈ΦFD\o Pjgxeg
H
xer
−α
xe + 1FD(S)Roe with Roe ,
Pjgoeg
H
oer
−α
oe , and gxe denotes the Ne × 1 complex
fading coefficient vector related to the link from a node at
x to an eavesdropper at e. The corresponding SIR of the
eavesdropper is
γSe = Ptg
H
o˜e(R
S
e )
−1go˜er
−α
o˜e . (3)
A. Secrecy Performance Metrics
We assume eavesdroppers do not collude with each other
such that each of them individually decodes a secret message.
To guarantee secrecy, each legitimate transmitter adopts the
Wyner’s wiretap encoding scheme [2] to encode secret infor-
mation. Thereby, two types of rates, namely, the rate of trans-
mitted codewords Rt and the rate of embedded information
bits Rs, need to be designed to meet requirements in terms of
the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities.
• Connection outage probability. If a legitimate S-link can
support rate Rt, the legitimate receiver is able to decode
a secret message and perfect connection is assured in
this link; otherwise a connection outage occurs. The
probability that such a connection outage event takes
place is referred to as the connection outage probability,
denoted as pSco.
• Secrecy outage probability. In the Wyner’s wiretap en-
coding scheme, the rate redundancy Re , Rt − Rs
is exploited to provide secrecy against eavesdropping.
If the value of Re lies above the capacity of the most
detrimental eavesdropping link, no information is leaked
to eavesdroppers and perfect secrecy is promised in the
legitimate link [2]; otherwise a secrecy outage occurs.
The probability that such a secrecy outage event takes
place in an S-link is referred to as the secrecy outage
probability, denoted as pSso.
In this paper, we concern ourselves with the following three
important metrics that measure the network-wide security
performance from an outage perspective.
1) ASLN. A link in which neither connection outage nor
secrecy outage occurs is called a secure link [11]. To measure
how many secure links can be guaranteed under rates Rt
and Rs, we use the metric named ASLN, which is defined
as the average number of secure links per unit area. Due to
the independence of pSco and p
S
so, ASLN, denoted as N , is
mathematically given by
N , qλl(1−pFDco )(1−pFDso )+(1−q)λl(1−pHDco )(1−pHDso ). (4)
2) NST. To assess the efficiency of secure transmissions,
we use the metric named NST [13], which is defined as the
achievable rate of successful information transmission per unit
area under the required connection outage and secrecy outage
probabilities. The NST, denoted as Ω, under a connection
outage probability pSco = σ and a secrecy outage probability
pSso = ǫ is given by
Ω , qλl(1− σ)RFDs + (1 − q)λl(1− σ)RHDs , (5)
where RSs , [R
S
t −RSe ]+, with RSt and RSe the codeword rate
and redundant rate that satisfy pSco(R
S
t ) = σ and p
S
so(R
S
e ) = ǫ,
respectively. The unit of Ω is nats/s/Hz/m2.
3) NSEE. To evaluate the energy efficiency of secure trans-
missions, we use the metric named NSEE, denoted as Ψ,
which is defined as the ratio of NST to the power consumed
per unit area,
Ψ ,
Ω
λl(Pt + Pc) + qλlPj
, (6)
where Pc combines the dynamic circuit power consumption of
transmit chains and the static power consumption in transmit
modes [29]. The unit of Ψ is nats/Joule/Hz.
4We emphasize that, the fraction q of FD receivers trig-
gers a non-trivial trade-off between reliability and secrecy,
and plays a key role in improving the metrics given above.
Intuitively, under a larger q, more FD jammers are activated
against eavesdroppers which benefits the secrecy; whereas
the increased jamming signals also interfere with legitimate
receivers and thus harm the reliability. The overall balance
of such conflicting effects needs to be carefully addressed. In
Sections IV, V and VI, we are going to respectively determine
the optimal fraction q that
• maximizes ASLN N given a pair of wiretap code rates
Rt and Rs;
• maximizes NST Ω given a pair of outage probabilities σ
and ǫ;
• maximizes NSEE Ψ with and without considering a
minimum required NST.
Before proceeding, in the following section we first provide
some insights into the behavior of the connection outage
probability pSco and the secrecy outage probability p
S
so with
respect to network parameters like q, η, etc., which is very
important to subsequent network design.
III. OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the connection outage prob-
ability and the secrecy outage probability for an arbitrary
legitimate link. For ease of notation, we define δ , 2/α,
κ , πΓ (1 + δ) Γ (1− δ) and ρ , Pj/Pt, which will be used
throughout the paper.
A. Connection Outage Probability
The connection outage probability of a typical S-link is
defined as the probability that the SIR γSo given in (1) falls
below an SIR threshold τt , 2
Rt − 1, i.e.,
pSco , Pr{γSo < τt}. (7)
The general expression of pSco is provided by the following
theorem. The interested readers are referred to [26, Th. 1] for
a detailed proof.
Theorem 1: The connection outage probability of a typical
S-link is given by
pSco = 1− e−1FD(S)ρηr
α
o τte−κ(1−q)λlr
2
oτ
δ
t LIFD (r
α
o τt/Pt) ,
(8)
where LIFD(r
α
o τt/Pt) = exp
(
− qλl
∫∞
0
∫ 2π
0
(
1 −
1
1+rαo τtv
−α
1
1+rαo τt(v
2+r2o−2vro cos θ)
−α/2
)
vdθdv
)
.
Theorem 1 provides an exact connection outage proba-
bility with three parts e−1FD(S)ρηr
α
o τt , e−κ(1−q)λlr
2
oτ
δ
t and
LIFD (r
α
o τt/Pt), reflecting the impacts of the interferences
from the typical receiver itself, from HD links and from FD
links, respectively. Although with pSco given in (8) we no longer
need to execute time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations,
the double integral in LIFD(r
α
o τt/Pt) greatly complicates the
further analysis, which motivates a more compact form. In
the following theorem, we provide the closed-form upper and
lower bounds for pSco, and refer the interested readers to [26,
Th. 2] for a detailed proof.
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Fig. 1: Connection outage probability vs. q for different values of η, with
α = 4, ρ = 1, ro = 1, λl = 3× 10
−3 and τt = 1.
Theorem 2: Connection outage probability pSco is upper and
lower bounded respectively by
pS,Uco = 1− e−1FD(S)ρηr
α
o τte−κr
2
oτ
δ
t λl(1+ρ
δq), (9)
pS,Lco = 1− e−1FD(S)ρηr
α
o τte
−κr2oτ
δ
t λl
(
1+ (1+δ)ρ
δ
−(1−δ)
2 q
)
.(10)
Theorem 2 shows that both bounds for the connection
outage probability increase exponentially in η, q and λl,
because of the increase of self- and mutual-interference. The
relationships between the connection outage probability pFDco
and parameters q and η are validated in Fig. 1, where the
results labeled by η = 0 also refer to an HD counterpart. We
observe that, although pFDco increases as q increases, the effect
is not very remarkable when η is large. This is because, in
the large η region the self-interference perceived at an FD
receiver dominates the interference (including both undesired
and jamming signals) from the other network nodes.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability of a typical S-link is defined
as the complement of the probability that any eavesdropper’s
SIR γSe falls below an SIR threshold τe , 2
Re − 1, i.e.,
pSso , 1− EΦFDEΦe
[ ∏
e∈Φe
Pr
{
γSe < τe|Φe,ΦFD
}]
. (11)
To calculate exact pSso is very difficult. Instead, we give an
upper bound for pSso in the following theorem. Please refer to
[26, Th. 3] for a detailed proof.
Theorem 3: Secrecy outage probability pSso of a typical S-
link is upper bounded by
pS,Uso = 1− exp

−λe Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,1)∑
i=0
(
κλFDρδτδe
)n−i
(n− i)! Ξ
S
n,i

 ,
(12)
where ΞSn,i =
∫∞
0
∫ 2π
0
ΛSi,θ,vv
2(n−i)e−κλ
FDρδτδe v
2
dθvdv with
ΛSi,θ,v =
(
1FD(S)ρτe
(
v/
√
v2+r2o−2vro cos θ
)α)i
1+1FD(S)ρτe
(
v/
√
v2+r2o−2vro cos θ
)α .
In the following sections, we use upper bound pS,Uso to
replace exact pSso, not simply for a tractable analysis but also
5for the following two reasons: on one hand, pS,Uso provides a
pessimistic evaluation of secrecy performance, which actually
benefits a robust design; on the other hand, as [13] shows,
pS,Uso will converge to p
S
so at the low secrecy outage probability
regime, and a low secrecy outage probability is expected in
order to guarantee a high level of secrecy.
Clearly, since 1FD(HD) = 0, we have Λ
HD
0,θ,v = 1 and
ΛHDi,θ,v = 0 for i > 0. Substituting these results into (12) yields
a closed-form expression for pHDso given below,
pHDso = 1− exp
(
− πλe
Ne−1∑
n=0
(
κλFDρδτδe
)n
n!
∫ ∞
0
v2n×
e−κλ
FDρδτδe v
2
dv2
)
= 1− e−
piλeNe
κqλlρ
δτδe , (13)
where the last equality follows from formula [33, (3.381.4)].
As to pFDso , the double integral in (12) makes it difficult to
analyze. Given that a single-antenna transmitter in a large-
scale ad hoc network usually has low transmit power and very
limited coverage, we should set the legitimate link distance ro
sufficiently small (compared with the distance between two
nodes that are not in pair) to guarantee both reliability and
secrecy. In the following, we resort to an asymptotic analysis
by letting ro → 0 in (12) in order to develop useful and
tractable insights into the behavior of pFDso . The following
corollary gives a quite simple approximation for pFDso .
Corollary 1: In the small ro regime, i.e., ro → 0, pFDso in
(12) is approximated by
p˜FDso = 1− exp
(
− πλeNe
κqλlρδτδe
(
1− ρτe/Ne
1 + ρτe
))
. (14)
Proof 1: Recalling Theorem 3, plugging ro → 0
into ΛFDi,θ,v yields Λ
FD
i,θ,v =
(ρτe)
i
1+ρτe
, and thus ΞFDn,i =
2π(ρτe)
i(n−i)!
(1+ρτe)
(κλFDρδτδe )
i−n−1. Substituting ΞFDn,i into (12)
completes the proof.
We stress that, although Corollary 1 is established under
the assumption ro → 0, it actually applies to more general
scenarios. Fig. 2 shows that p˜FDso in (14) approximates to
pFDso in (12) in quite a wide range of ro and λe particularly
when λf is small, which demonstrates high accuracy for
the approximation. Hereafter, unless specified otherwise, we
often use this approximation to deal with the secrecy outage
probability.
Eqn. (13) and (14) clearly show that secrecy outage proba-
bilities increase exponentially with λe and Ne. This is amelio-
rated by increasing q or ρ. In addition, secrecy outage proba-
bilities increase as α increases. This is because, in a large path-
loss exponent environment, jamming signals have undergone
a strong attenuation before they arrive at eavesdroppers.
IV. AREA SECURE LINK NUMBER
In this section, we maximize ASLN N under a given pair
of wiretap code rates Rt and Rs by determining the optimal
fraction q of FD receivers.
To facilitate a robust design, we use the upper bounded
connection outage probability pS,Uco given in (9), which actually
pessimistically assess the connection performance. We also
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Fig. 2: Secrecy outage probability vs. λe for different values of ro and λf ,
with α = 4, ρ = 10 and τe = 1.
suppose eavesdroppers use a large number of antennas in order
to do better wiretapping, which also gives a pessimistic evalu-
ation of the secrecy performance. Resorting to an asymptotic
analysis of pFDso by letting Ne ≫ 1 in (14), pFDso shares the same
expression as pHDso in (13), i.e.,
pSso = 1− e
− piλeNe
κqλlρ
δτδe . (15)
Substituting (9) and (15) into (4) yields
N = λl
(
qe−ρηr
α
o τt + 1− q
)
e
−κr2oτ
δ
t λl(1+ρ
δq)− piλeNe
κqλlρ
δτδe .
(16)
Introducing an auxiliary function F (q) = (qA + (1 −
q))e−Bq−C/q with A , e−ρηr
α
o τt < 1, B , κr2oτ
δ
t ρ
δλl
and C , πλeNe
κλlρδτδe
, we have N = λle
−κr2oτ
δ
t λlF (q) such that
parameter q only exists in F (q). Hence, maximizing N is
equivalent to maximizing F (q), which can be formulated as
max
q
F (q) = (qA+ (1− q))e−Bq−C/q, s.t. 0 < q ≤ 1.
(17)
In the following theorem, we prove the quasi-concavity [34,
Sec. 3.4.2] of F (q) in q, and give the optimal solution of
problem (17).
Theorem 4: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that
maximizes ASLN N is given by
q∗sl =
{
1, πλeNe > κλlρ
δτδe (1/A+B − 1),
q◦sl, otherwise,
(18)
where q◦sl is the unique root q of the following equation(
A+ q−1 − 1) (1 + Cq−1 −Bq)− q−1 = 0. (19)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (19) is initially positive and then
negative when C ≤ 1/A+B−1; and thus, q◦sl can be efficiently
calculated using the bisection method with (19).
Proof 2: Please refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 4 indicates that as eavesdropper density λe or
eavesdropper antenna number Ne is sufficiently large such
that πλeNe > κλlρ
δτδe (1/A+B− 1), all legitimate receivers
should work in the FD mode; otherwise a portion of HD
receivers are permitted, just as depicted in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that maximizes ASLN N vs.
λl for different values of ro and ρ, with α = 4, λe = 10
−3 , Ne = 6,
η = −10dB, τt = 2 and τe = 1.
Although it is difficult to provide an explicit expression for
the optimal q◦sl given in (18), we are still able to develop some
insights into the behavior of q◦sl in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The optimal q◦sl given in (18) monotonically
increases with λe and Ne, and monotonically decreases with
λl, ro, η, ρ, τt and τe. In the perfect SIC case, i.e., η = 0, a
closed-form expression on q◦sl can be further given by
q◦,η=0sl =
√
C
B
=
1
κλlρδro
√
πλeNe
τδt τ
δ
e
, (20)
where q◦,η=0sl decreases linearly in λl and ro, and increases
linearly in
√
λe and
√
Ne.
Proof 3: Please refer to Appendix B.
Corollary 2 provides some useful insights into the optimal
fraction of FD receivers, which will benefit network design.
For example, more FD receivers are needed to cope with
more eavesdroppers or more eavesdropping antennas; whereas
adding legitimate nodes or increasing jamming power allows a
smaller fraction of FD receivers. In addition, we should better
activate fewer FD receivers when legitimate link distance ro
increases, since the desired signal suffers a greater attenuation
and the negative effect of self-interference increases more
significantly. Some of the properties in Corollary 2 are verified
in Fig. 3, and the others are relatively intuitive.
Having obtained the optimal fraction q∗sl given in (18), the
maximum ASLN N∗ can be calculated by plugging q∗sl into
(16). Fig. 4 depicts ASLN as a function of Ne and clearly
demonstrates the superiority of our optimization scheme over
those fixed-q schemes. For example, the maximum ASLN
obtained at q = q∗sl is nearly twice as large as that obtained
at q = 0.5 for a small Ne, and is more than twice as large as
that obtained at q = 0.1 for a large Ne. We observe that, as
ρ increases, the ASLN obtained at q = 0.5 becomes smaller
in the small Ne region whereas becomes larger in the large
Ne region. The underlying reason is, when Ne is small, the
negative impact of jamming signals on legitimate links is larger
than that on wiretap links such that fewer FD jammers should
be activated; conversely, as Ne increases, the negative effect
of jamming signals on wiretap links increases obviously. In
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Fig. 4: ASLN vs. Ne for different values of q and ρ, with α = 3, λl = 10
−2,
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sharp contrast to this, the maximum N∗ always increases
in ρ regardless of Ne. This is because the optimal fraction
q∗sl adaptively decreases as ρ increases so as to mitigate the
negative effect of jamming signals.
V. NETWORK-WIDE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
In this section, we maximize NST Ω under a pair of outage
probabilities σ and ǫ by determining the optimal fraction q of
FD receivers, which can be formulated as
max
q
Ω, s.t. 0 < q ≤ 1. (21)
To proceed, we first derive the SIR thresholds τSt and τ
S
e
that satisfy pSco(τ
S
t ) = σ and p
S
so(τ
S
e ) = ǫ, respectively. We
can easily calculate τHDt from (9); whereas it is in general
difficult to derive analytical expressions for τFDt . However, as
reported in [30], self-interference can be efficiently mitigated
by exploiting the propagation domain, analog circuit domain
and digital circuit domain; particularly in analog and digital
signal processing it is now feasible to have up to 110 dB SIC
capability [31]. Such positive news motivates us to consider
a perfect SIC case by ignoring self-interference in order to
facilitate the design. Letting η = 0 in (9) and (15) yields
uniform expressions for τSt and τ
S
e , respectively, given by
τot =
(
σo
κ (λHD + [1 + ρδ]λFD) r2o
)α/2
, (22)
τoe =
(
πλeNe
κρδλFDǫo
)α/2
, (23)
where σo , ln
1
1−σ and ǫo , ln
1
1−ǫ . Substituting τ
S
t = τ
o
t
and τSe = τ
o
e into (5) yields
Ω = λl(1− σ)
[
ln
1 + τot
1 + τoe
]+
. (24)
Clearly, to achieve a positive Ω, we should ensure τot > τ
o
e ,
which is equivalent to
q > qm , (∆− 1)−1 ρ−δ, (25)
7where ∆ , σoǫoπλeNer2o
. This indicates, to meet outage probabil-
ity constraints, a minimum fraction qm must be guaranteed.
Given that qm < 1, the choice of σ and ǫ should satisfy
∆ > 1 + ρ−δ, (26)
i.e., too small a σ and/or too small an ǫ might not be promised.
In the following, we only consider the non-trivial case of
a positive Ω, i.e., q > qm; and thus, maximizing Ω in
(24) is equivalent to maximizing ln
1+τot
1+τoe
. Recalling (22), we
introduce the following auxiliary function
w(q) = ln
w1(q)
w2(q)
, (27)
where w1(q) = 1 + β1(1 + ρ
δq)−
α
2 with β1 ,
(
σo
κλlr2o
)α
2
,
w2(q) = 1+ β2(ρ
δq)−
α
2 with β2 ,
(
πλeNe
κλlǫo
)α
2
, and w1(q) >
w2(q) > 1 for q ∈ (qm, 1]. Hence, problem (24) changes to
max
q
w(q), s.t. 0 < qm < q ≤ 1. (28)
Fortunately, we also successfully prove the quasi-concavity of
w(q) in q and provide the optimal solution of problem (28) in
the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that
maximizes the NST Ω in (24) is
q∗st =


∅, πλeNeǫ−1o ∈ [X,∞),
1, πλeNeǫ
−1
o ∈ [Y,X),
q◦st, πλeNeǫ
−1
o ∈ (0, Y ),
(29)
where q∗st = ∅ corresponds to an empty feasible
region of q, X , σo/
(
r2o
(
1 + ρ−δ
))
, Y ,(
κ−α/2λ
−α/2
l ρ
−(1+δ) +
(
1 + ρ−δ
)
X−α/2
)−δ
< X 2,
and q◦st is the unique root q that satisfies
1− 1 + ρ
δq + β−11
(
1 + ρδq
)1+α/2
ρδq + β−12 (ρ
δq)1+α/2
= 0. (30)
The LHS of (30) is a monotonically increasing function of q
in the range q ∈ (qm, 1], and is first negative and then positive
when πλeNeǫ
−1
o ∈ (0, Y ); and thus, the value of q◦st can be
efficiently calculated using the bisection method with (30).
Proof 4: Please refer to Appendix C.
Theorem 5 shows that when Ne or λe is sufficiently small
such that πλeNeǫ
−1
o < X , there exists a unique fraction q that
maximizes NST Ω; otherwise no positive Ω can be achieved.
In the following corollary, we provide some insights into
the optimal q◦st given in (29).
Corollary 3: The optimal q◦st given in (29) monotonically
increases with λe, Ne and ro, and monotonically decreases
with σ, ǫ, ρ and λl.
Proof 5: Please refer to Appendix D.
Corollary 3 indicates that under a moderate constraint on
the connection outage probability (a large σ) or on the secrecy
outage probability (a large ǫ), we should reduce the portion
of FD receivers. This is because, on one hand, reducing
FD receivers decreases interference such that greatly benefits
2Y <
((
1 + ρ−δ
)
X−α/2
)
−δ
=
(
1 + ρ−δ
)
−δ
X < X .
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Fig. 5: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that maximizes NST Ω vs. λl
for different values of ro and σ, with α = 4, λe = 10
−4, Ne = 4, ρ = 2
and ǫ = 0.05.
legitimate transmissions especially when a large σ is tolerable;
on the other hand, if a large ǫ is tolerable, we need fewer FD
jammers against eavesdropping. It is worth mentioning that the
optimal fraction q◦st increases as ro increases, which is just
the opposite of what we have observed in Corollary 2. The
reason behind is that here we have ignored self-interference
and meanwhile eavesdroppers who are close to a legitimate
transmitter is less impaired by the paired FD receiver as ro
increases, hence more FD receivers are needed.
The aforementioned theoretic results are validated in Fig.
5, where we see that the optimal fraction q◦st deeply depends
on parameters ro and σ. When ro is large and meanwhile
σ is small (e.g., ro = 2, σ = 0.1) such that condition (26)
is violated, there exists no positive NST no matter how the
network design allocates FD and HD receivers. That means in
such a legitimate transmission distance, the connection outage
probability requirement is too rigorous to satisfy. In order to
achieve a certain level of NST, network design should have to
relax the connection outage probability constraint or shorten
the legitimate distance.
Let us recall (47) in Appendix D, it is not difficult to
deduce that q◦st is inversely proportional to ρ
δ, since ρδq◦st
keeps constant in φ(ρδq◦st) = 0 when the other parameters are
fixed. As a consequence, q◦st → 0 as ρ → ∞. If we consider
a dense network by letting λl → ∞ in (48), we can further
obtain a simple expression for q◦st given below
q◦,λl→∞st =
(
∆1/(1+δ) − 1
)−1
ρ−δ, (31)
which is independent of λl, just as shown in Fig. 5. This is
different from what we can see in Fig. 3 where the optimal
q∗sl goes to zero as λl goes to infinity. This is because a pos-
itive secrecy rate mainly depends on the relative interference
strength between legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers as λl
goes to infinity, and a certain portion of FD receivers must be
activated to ensure the superiority of the main channel over
the wiretap channel in terms of channel quality.
Substituting q∗st given in (29) into (24), we obtain the
maximum NST Ω∗. Fig. 6 compares this NST Ω∗ and those
obtained at fixed q’s. Obviously, activating a proper fraction
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Fig. 6: NST vs. σ for different values of and α, with λl = 10
−3, λe = 10
−4 ,
Ne = 4, ro = 1, ǫ = 0.01 and ρ = 1.
of FD receivers significantly improves NST. For example,
the optimal fraction q∗st increases NST by about 28% than
the equal proportion case (i.e., q = 0.5), and by up to
1400% than the small-q case (e.g., q = 0.1). We can observe
that, too small a σ might not be satisfied while too large a
σ results in a small successful transmission probability and
accordingly small NST. Therefore, a moderate constraint on
the connection outage probability is desirable for improving
NST. Fig. 6 also illustrates the influence of the path loss
exponent α on NST. A general trend is that NST increases
as α becomes larger. The reason behind is that the distance
between a legitimate transmitter-receiver pair is small such
that the signal attenuation in a legitimate link is less signif-
icant than it is in the eavesdropper link. This implies short-
range secure communications might prefer a large path-loss
exponent, especially in a sparse-eavesdropper environment.
VI. NETWORK-WIDE SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY
In this section, we determine the optimal fraction q of FD
receivers that maximizes the NSEE Ψ with and without con-
sidering a required minimum NST. As presented in previous
sections, we consider the scenario where self-interference is
efficiently canceled.
A. Without NST Constraint
In this subsection, we ignore the requirement of a minimum
NST. Substituting (24) into (6), the optimization problem of
interest can be formulated as
max
q
Ψ =
λl(1− σ)w(q)
λl(Pt + Pc) + qλlPj
, s.t. 0 < qm < q ≤ 1,
(32)
where w(q) and qm have been defined in (27) and (28),
respectively. Introducing ρc ,
Pj
Pt+Pc
and the following
auxiliary function
J(q) =
w(q)
1 + ρcq
, (33)
the object function Ψ of problem (32) can be rewritten in the
form ofΨ = 1−σPt+Pc J(q). Clearly, maximizingΨ is equivalent
−20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
The Jamming Power Ratio, ρ (dB)
O
p
ti
m
a
l
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
F
D
R
ec
ei
v
er
s,
q
∗ e
e
 
 
σ = 0.1, ǫ = 0.01
σ = 0.3, ǫ = 0.01
σ = 0.1, ǫ = 0.02
σ = 0.3, ǫ = 0.02
q∗ee = ∅
Fig. 7: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that maximizes NSEE Ψ vs.
ρ for different values of σ and ǫ, with α = 4, λl = 10
−3, λe = 10
−4,
Ne = 4 and ro = 1.
to maximizing J(q). In the following theorem, we prove the
quasi-concavity of J(q) in q, again, and provide the optimal
solution to problem (32).
Theorem 6: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that
maximizes the NSEE Ψ in (32) is
q∗ee =


∅, πλeNeǫ−1o ≥ X,
1, πλeNeǫ
−1
o < X &
W
w(1) >
δρc
1+ρc
,
q◦ee, otherwise,
(34)
where W , 1−w−12 (1)− 1−w
−1
1 (1)
1+ρ−δ
and X has been defined
in Theorem 5. In (34), q◦ee is the unique root q of the following
equation
Q(q) = 0, (35)
where Q(q) = w
′
(q)(1 + ρcq) − ρcw(q) is initially positive
and then negative as q increases; and thus the value of q◦ee can
be efficiently computed using the bisection method with (35).
Proof 6: Please refer to Appendix E.
In the following corollary, we develop some insights into
the behavior of q◦ee given in (34).
Corollary 4: The optimal q◦ee given in (34) monotonically
increases with λe, Ne and ro, and monotonically decreases
with σ, ǫ and ρ.
Proof 7: Please refer to Appendix F.
The properties of q◦ee follow Corollary 3. Fig. 7 depicts the
optimal fraction q∗ee and verifies Corollary 4 well. We see that,
too small σ and ǫ might not be simultaneously satisfied (e.g.,
σ = 0.1, ǫ = 0.01). As can be observed, the optimal q∗ee
keeps large in the small ρ region, and dramatically decreases
as ρ increases. This is because the increase of jamming power
provides a relief to the need of FD jammers. In addition, as
σ or ǫ decreases, the feasible region of ρ that produces a
positive Ψ reduces. This suggests that to meet more rigorous
connection outage and secrecy outage constraints, we should
consume more power in sending jamming signals.
Fig. 8 depicts NSEE versus ρ for different values of q.
We see that as ρ increases, NSEE first increases and then
decreases. The underlying reason is that too small jamming
power makes NST small whereas too large jamming power
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Fig. 8: NSEE Ψ vs. ρ for different values of q, with α = 4, λl = 10
−3 ,
λe = 10
−4, Ne = 4, σ = 0.3, ǫ = 0.02 and ro = 1.
leads to large power consumption; both aspects result in small
NSEE. We also find that adaptively adjusting the fraction of
FD receivers to jamming power significantly improves NSEE
compared with fixed-q cases, although the latter can approach
the optimal performance in some specific regions, e.g., q = 1
in the small ρ region.
In the following corollary, we reveal how the legitimate
node density λl influences the optimal allocation between FD
and HD receivers and the corresponding NSEE.
Corollary 5: In a sparse network, i.e., λl → 0, both
the optimal fraction q∗ee and the maximum NSEE Ψ
∗ keep
constant, which are independent of λl.
Proof 8: Please refer to Appendix G.
B. With NST Constraint
For more practical design, we should also take NST into
consideration when maximizing NSEE. In this subsection, we
impose a constraint on problem (32) that NST Ω lies above
threshold Ω◦, i.e.,Ω > Ω◦. Since we have already obtained the
maximumΩ∗ in Sec. VI-A, for convenience, we only consider
the case Ω∗ > Ω◦ here. If Ω∗ ≤ Ω◦, we just set Ψ to zero.
Corollary 6: The optimal fraction of FD receivers that
maximizes the NSEE Ψ in (32) subject to the constraint
Ω > Ω◦ is given as follows
q⋆ee =

∅, πλeNeǫ−1o ≥ X,
1, πλeNeǫ
−1
o < X &
W
w(1) >
δρc
1+ρc
,
max
(
q
(1)
st , q
◦
ee
)
, Y ≤ πλeNeǫ−1o < X & Ww(1) ≤ δρc1+ρc ,
q+ee, otherwise,
(36)
where q◦ee has bee given in (34) and q
+
ee is determined as
q+ee =


q◦ee, q
(1)
st ≤ q◦ee < q(2)st ,
q
(1)
st , q
◦
ee < q
(1)
st ,
q
(2)
st , q
◦
ee ≥ q(2)st .
(37)
Let us denote Ω(q) as a function of q. If there exists only one
root q ∈ (qm, 1] that satisfies Ω(q) = Ω◦, we denote this root
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Fig. 9: The maximum NSEE Ψ∗ vs. λl for different values of ρ and Ne,
with α = 4, λe = 10
−4, ro = 1, σ = 0.3, ǫ = 0.03 and Ω
◦ = 0.001.
The results labeled (34) and (36) are obtained without and with the constraint
Ω > Ω◦, respectively.
TABLE I: Relationships between Optimal q∗ and Key Parameters
Objectives q∗ increases with q∗ decreases with
ASLN λe, Ne λl, ro, η, ρ, τt, τe
NST λe, Ne, ro λl , ρ, σ, ǫ
NSEE λe, Ne, ro ρ, σ, ǫ
as q
(1)
st ; if there are two such roots, we denote them as q
(1)
st
and q
(2)
st such that q
(1)
st < q
(2)
st .
Proof 9: Please refer to Appendix H.
Fig. 9 shows the maximum NSEE Ψ∗ with q∗ee in (34) and
Ψ
⋆ with q⋆ee in (36). As indicated in Corollary 4, Ψ
∗ keeps
constant in the small λl region, whereas Ψ
⋆ becomes zero
since the constraint Ω > Ω◦ is not satisfied. When λl falls
in the medium range, the curve of Ψ∗ and its counterpart
Ψ
⋆ merge and vary smoothly. As λl increases further, both
Ψ
∗ and Ψ⋆ quickly drop to zero. Therefore, a moderate
network density is desirable. Fig. 9 also indicates that although
increasing jamming power helps to suppress eavesdroppers, it
is at a cost of energy efficiency.
To better guide network designers on how to well design
the network, Table I summarizes the relationships between
the optimal fraction q of FD receivers and key parameters in
different objectives.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we study physical layer security in a wireless
ad hoc network with a hybrid full-/half-duplex receiver de-
ployment strategy. We provide a comprehensive performance
analysis and network design under a stochastic geometry
framework. We first analyze connection outage and secrecy
outage probabilities for a typical legitimate link, and show that
enabling more FD receivers increases the connection outage
probability but decreases the secrecy outage probability. Based
on the analytical results of the dual probabilities, we prove that
ASLN, NST and NSEE are all quasi-concave on the fraction
of FD receivers, and maximize each of them by providing the
optimal fraction. We further develop various useful properties
on this optimal fraction. Numerical results are demonstrated
to validate our theoretical findings.
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This paper opens up several interesting research directions.
For example, the proposed framework can be extended to
investigate the cooperative or multi-antenna FD receivers,
where additional degrees of freedom might be gained not
only in alleviating the self-interference but also in designing
the jamming signals. The benefit of FD receiver jamming
techniques can be further exploited by jointly optimizing the
allocation between FD and HD receivers and the jamming
transmit power of each FD receiver, given that the latter also
strikes a non-trivial tradeoff between reliability and secrecy.
Another possible direction for future research is to consider
the randomness of self-interference and propose an adaptive
and intelligent criterion to select work mode for receivers,
e.g., letting those receivers with instantaneous self-interference
power lying below a certain value work in the FD mode and
the rest work in the HD mode.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 4
We start by taking the first-oder derivative of F (q) on q
F
′
(q) = K(q)e−Bq−C/q, (38)
where
K(q) = (A+ 1/q − 1) (1 + C/q −Bq)− 1/q. (39)
To determine the sign of F
′
(q), we first investigate the behav-
ior of K(q) at the boundaries q → 0+ and q = 1, respectively.
Substituting q → 0+ into (39) yields limq→0+ K(q) =
limq→0+
(
C/q2
)
> 0. Substituting q = 1 into (39) yields
K(1) = A(1+C−B)−1, the sign of which relies on specific
values of A, B and C. Consider the following two cases.
1)K(1) > 0: We have A(1+C−B) > 1⇒ C−B > 1/A−
1 > 0, which yields C/q−Bq ≥ C−B > 0. Substituting this
inequality along with 1/q > 1 into (38), we obtain K(q) >
A(1 + C − B) − 1 > 0, i.e., F ′(q) > 0. This means F (q)
monotonically increases in q within the entire range q ∈ (0, 1],
and the optimal q that maximizes F (q) or N is q∗ = 1.
2) K(1) < 0: There at least exists one point q ∈ (0, 1] that
satisfies K(q) = 0 since K(q) is a continuous function of
q and limq→0+ K(q) > 0. Denote an arbitrary zero-crossing
point q of K(q) as qo, i.e., K(qo) = 0. To determine the
monotonicity of F (q) in q, we first take the second-order
derivative of F (q) at q = qo from (38)
F
′′
(qo) = K
′(qo)e
−Bqo−C/qo , (40)
where
K ′(qo) =
(
B + Cq−2o
)
A+ 2Cq−3o − Cq−2o −B. (41)
Clearly, the sign of F
′′
(qo) follows that of K
′(qo). We resort
to the equation K(qo) = 0 in (39), which yields A = 1 −
1
qo
(
1− 11+C/qo−Bqo
)
. Given that 0 < A < 1, we readily
obtain C/q > Bq, substituting which combined with 0 < qo ≤
1 into (41) yields K ′(qo) < 0, i.e., F
′′(qo) < 0. Invoking the
definition of single-variable quasi-concave function [34, Sec.
3.4.2], we conclude that F (q) is a quasi-concave function of
q, and there exists a unique q that maximizes F (q). In other
words, F (q) initially increases and then decreases in q, and
the peak value of F (q) is achieved at the unique root q of the
equation K(q) = 0. By now, we have completed the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 2
Recall (39), and the optimal q◦sl satisfies K(q
◦
sl) = 0.
We first take the first-order derivative of q◦sl on A using the
derivative rule for implicit functions with K(q◦sl) = 0, i.e.,
dq◦sl
dA
= − ∂K(q
◦
sl)/∂A
∂K(q◦sl)/∂q
◦
sl
. (42)
From (39), we have ∂K(q◦sl)/∂A = 1 + C/q
◦
sl − Bq◦sl > 0.
From (41), we know that ∂K(q◦sl)/∂q
◦
sl < 0. Thus, we obtain
dq◦sl/dA > 0. In a similar way, we can prove dq
◦
sl/dB < 0
and dq◦sl/dC > 0. Observing the expressions of A, B and C
directly yields the relationships between the optimal q◦sl and
the relevant parameters. For the perfect SIC case, substituting
η = 0, or, equivalently, A = 1, into (19) directly yields the
result given in (20).
C. Proof of Theorem 5
Taking the first-order derivative of w(q) in (27) on q, i.e.,
w
′
(q) =
w
′
1(q)
w1(q)
− w
′
2(q)
w2(q)
, (43)
where w
′
1(q) = − ρ
δ [w1(q)−1]
δ(1+ρδq)
and w
′
2(q) = −w2(q)−1δq . Directly
determining either the sign of w
′
(q) or the concavity of w(q)
from the second-order derivative w
′′
(q) is difficult. Instead, we
prove the quasi-concavity of w(q) on q by reforming w
′
(q) as
w
′
(q) =
w
′
1(q)
w1(q)
φ(q) with φ(q) given by
φ(q) = 1− w1(q)w
′
2(q)
w
′
1(q)w2(q)
= 1−
(
1 + ρδq
)
w1(q)(w2(q)− 1)
ρδq(w1(q)− 1)w2(q) .
(44)
Apparently, the first term w
′
1(q)/w1(q) is negative. Next, we
determine the sign of φ(q). Taking the first-order derivative of
φ(q) on q, and after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
φ
′
(q) =
[1 + δw2(q)]w1(q) + ρ
δq [w1(q)− w2(q)]
δρδq2[w1(q)− 1]w22(q)/[w2(q)− 1]
. (45)
Since w1(q) > w2(q) > 1, φ
′
(q) > 0 always holds, i.e.,
φ(q) monotonically increases with q. When q = qm, we have
w1(qm) = w2(qm) and
w
′
2(qm)
w
′
1(qm)
= 1+ρ
δqm
ρδqm
, thus φ(qm) =
− 1
ρδqm
< 0. When q = 1, φ(1) = 1− β2(1+ρ
δ)(β1+(1+ρδ)α/2)
β1ρδ(β2+ρ)
,
the sign of which depends on β1 and β2. Specifically, if
1 + β−11 (1 + ρ
δ)1+α/2 > β−12 ρ
1+δ , we have φ(1) < 0;
otherwise, φ(1) ≥ 0. In the following, we derive the optimal
q that maximizes w(q) by distinguishing two cases.
1) If φ(1) < 0, φ(q) < 0 holds in the entire range
q ∈ (qm, 1]. Accordingly, we have w′ (q) > 0, i.e., w(q)
monotonically increases with q. Therefore, the optimal q that
maximizes w(q) is q∗ = 1.
2) If φ(1) ≥ 0, φ(q) is initially negative and then positive in
the range q ∈ (qm, 1]; the zero-crossing point q that satisfies
11
φ(q) = 0 is denoted by qo. We can also conclude that w
′
(q) is
initially positive and then negative after q exceeds qo. In other
words, w(q) first increases and then decreases with q, and qo
is the solution that yields the peak value of w(q).
By now, we have proved the quasi-concavity of w(q) on q.
Combined with qm < 1⇒ ∆ > 1+ρ−δ and the given results,
we complete the proof.
D. Proof of Corollary 3
Recall (44), and the optimal q◦st satisfies φ(q
◦
st) = 0. Taking
the first-order derivative of q◦st on β1 using the derivative rule
for implicit functions with φ(q◦st) = 0 yields
dq◦st
dβ1
= − ∂φ(q
◦
st)/∂β1
∂φ(q◦st)/∂q
◦
st
, (46)
where
∂φ(q◦st)
∂β1
=
β−21 (1+ρ
δq)1+α/2
ρδq+β−12 (ρ
δq)1+α/2
> 0 and
∂φ(q◦st)
∂q◦st
> 0 (see
(45)); and thus,
dq◦st
dβ1
< 0. Similarly, we can prove
dq◦st
dβ2
> 0.
From the expressions of β1 and β2 given in (27), we can infer
that q◦st increases in λe, Ne and ro, while decreases in σ and
ǫ. As to
dq◦st
dρ , we first express φ(ρ
δq) as
φ(ρδq) = 1− 1 + ρ
δq + β−11 (1 + ρ
δq)1+α/2
ρδq + β−12 (ρ
δq)1+α/2
. (47)
Taking the first-order derivative of φ(ρδq) on ρδq and invoking
the equation φ(ρδq◦st) = 0, we can prove
∂φ(q◦st)
∂ρ > 0. Thereby,
we have
dq◦st
dρ = − ∂φ(q
◦
st)/∂ρ
∂φ(q◦st)/∂q
◦
st
< 0. As to
dq◦st
dλl
, we let
φ(λl) = 1− 1 + ρ
δq + b1λ
α/2
l (1 + ρ
δq)1+α/2
ρδq + b2λ
α/2
l (ρ
δq)1+α/2
, (48)
where b1 ,
(
κr2o
σo
)α
2
and b2 ,
(
κǫo
πλeNe
)α
2
. Taking the
first-order derivative of φ(λl) on λl and invoking β1(1 +
ρδq)−α/2 > β2(ρ
δq)−α/2 in (27), we can prove
∂φ(q◦st)
∂λl
> 0
and
dq◦st
dλl
= − ∂φ(q◦st)/∂λl∂φ(q◦st)/∂q◦st < 0. By now, the proof is complete.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
We start by giving the first-order derivative of J(q) on q,
J
′
(q) = Q(q)(1 + ρcq)
−2, (49)
where Q(q) is given in (35). To proceed, we first give the
following lemma which is very important to subsequent proof.
Lemma 1: If w
′
(q) > 0 for q ∈ (qm, 1], Q′(q) < 0 holds.
Proof 10: Since Q
′
(q) = w′′(q)(1+Bq), to prove Q
′
(q) >
0 we need only to prove w
′′
(q) > 0. Taking the derivative
of w
′
(q) in (43) on q yields w
′′
(q) which is given in (50)
at the top of the next page, where the last equality holds
for w
′′
1 (q) =
(
(1 + δ)[w1(q)− 1]ρ2δ
)
/
(
δ2(1 + ρδq)2
)
and
w
′′
2 (q) = ((1 + δ)[w2(q)− 1]) /
(
δ2q2
)
. Invoking (43), we can
readily obtain the following relationship
w
′
(q) > 0⇒ w2(q)− 1
w1(q)− w2(q) >
ρδq
w1(q)
. (51)
Plugging the above inequality into (50) yields
w
′′
(q) < − w1(q)− w2(q)
δ2w1(q)w22(q)ρ
−δq(1 + ρδq)2
×(
1 + ρδq[1− w2(q)/w1(q)] + δ(1 + ρδq)w2(q)
)
< 0, (52)
which completes the proof.
Next, we are going to determine the sign of Q(q) or J
′
(q)
in (49). We first determine the sign of Q(q) at the boundaries
qm and 1. Combined with w1(qm) = w2(qm), we have
Q(qm) =
w1(qm)− 1
δw1(qm)
(
1
qm
− ρ
δ
1 + ρδqm
)
> 0. (53)
Substituting q = 1 into Q(q) yields
Q(1) = w
′
(1)(1 + ρc)− ρcw(1) =
α
2
(1 + ρc)
(
1− w−12 (1)−
1− w−11 (1)
1 + ρ−δ
)
− ρcw(1), (54)
The sign of Q(1) depends on the values of involved parame-
ters. Let us distinguish two cases.
1) If Q(1) > 0, we have w
′
(1) > 0. Since w(q) is quasi-
concave in q (Theorem 5), w
′
(q) > 0 holds in the whole range
of q ∈ (qm, 1], which further yields Q′(q) < 0 according to
Lemma 1. In other words, Q(q) monotonically decreases in q,
and thus, Q(q) > Q(1) > 0, or, J
′
(q) > 0. This means J(q)
monotonically increases in q, and the optimal q that maximizes
J(q) is q = 1.
2) If Q(1) ≤ 0, combined with Q(qm) > 0 in (53), there
at least exists one point q ∈ (qm, 1] that satisfies Q(q) = 0
due to the continuity of Q(q) in q. Denote a zero-crossing
point q of Q(q) as qo such that Q(qo) = 0, or, J
′
(qo) = 0. To
determine the quasi-concavity of J(q) in q, we first take the
second-order derivative of J(q) at q = qo, which is
J
′′
(qo) = Q
′
(qo)(1 + ρcqo)
−2. (55)
Recalling Q(qo) = 0 yields w
′
(qo) =
Bw(qo)
1+ρcqo
> 0. From
Lemma 1, we obtain Q
′
(qo) < 0, i.e., J
′′
(qo) < 0. This means
J(q) is quasi-concave on q, and the optimal q that maximizes
J(q) is the unique root of equation Q(q) = 0, i.e., q = qo. By
now, the proof is complete.
F. Proof of Corollary 4
Recall (35), and the optimal q◦ee satisfies Q(q
◦
ee) = 0. Simi-
lar to the proof of Corollary 3, we take the first-order derivative
of q◦ee on w1(q
◦
ee) and on w2(q
◦
ee), respectively, using the
derivative rule for implicit functions with Q(q◦ee) = 0, and
then prove
dq◦ee
dw1(q◦ee)
< 0 and
dq◦ee
dw2(q◦ee)
> 0. Through observing
the monotonicity of w1(q) and w2(q) with respect to the
parameters involved in Corollary 4, we can complete the proof.
G. Proof of Corollary 5
The expressions of w1(q) and w2(q) in (27) tell that as λl →
0, we have w1(q)−1w1(q) → 1,
w2(q)−1
w2(q)
→ 1 and w(q) → α2 ln∆.
Substituting these results into (35), we find Q(q) independent
of λl and so is the root q of Q(q) = 0. Plugging the obtained
solution q into (32), we can easily conclude that the resulting
Ψ is also independent of λl. The proof is complete.
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w
′′
(q) =
w
′′
1 (q)w1(q)− (w
′
1(q))
2
w21(q)
− w
′′
2 (q)w2(q)− (w
′
2(q))
2
w22(q)
=
(w1(q)− w2(q))
δ2w21(q)w
2
2(q)q
2(1 + ρδq)2
{
ρδq
(
ρδq [w1(q) + w2(q)− w1(q)w2(q)]− 2w
2
1(q)[w2(q)− 1]
w1(q)− w2(q)
)
− w
2
1(q)[w2(q)− 1]
[w1(q)− w2(q)]
+ δρδqw1(q)w2(q)
(
ρδq − 2w1(q)[w2(q) − 1]
w1(q)− w2(q)
)
− δw
2
1(q)w2(q)[w2(q)− 1]
w1(q)− w2(q)
}
, (50)
H. Proof of Corollary 6
Let us recall (34). Obviously, q⋆ee = ∅ if q∗ee = ∅; q⋆ee = 1 if
q∗ee = 1 andΩ(1) > Ω
◦ simultaneously hold. When q∗ee = q
◦
ee,
let us distinguish two cases. In the first case, there is only one
root q ∈ (qm, 1], denoted as q(1)st , that satisfies Ω(q) = Ω◦. If
q
(1)
st < q
◦
ee, we have Ω(q
◦
ee) > Ω
◦ and q⋆ee = q
◦
ee; otherwise,
q⋆ee = q
(1)
st . In the second case, there are two roots q
(1)
st and q
(2)
st
such that q
(1)
st < q
(2)
st . In a similar way, we can obtain q
⋆
ee = q
+
ee
with q+ee given in (36). By now, the proof is complete.
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